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Workmen's compensation statutes generally provide that em-
ployee death or disability is compensable only if "arising out of and
in the course of the employment."' This seemingly straightforward
statement of the required work connection lacks precision in its prac-
tical application.2 The imprecision has forced courts and agencies,
both state and federal, to render an almost wasteful number of deci-
sions to establish sufficintly definite standards.3 Different jurisdic-
tions have concluded that the same statutory language supports widely
different limits of coverage. Cases demanding a close connection be-
tween injury and empipyment4 can be found side by side with cases
t Professor of' Law, University" of Iowa. "B.. 1949, University of Chicago; LL.B.
1952, Harvard University.
1 1 A. LA ON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 6.10, at 41-42 (1966). This statutory
formula is adopted from British acts. See, e.g., National Insurance (Industrial Injuries)
Act of 1946, 9 & 10 Geo. 6, c. 62, § 1; Workmen's Compensation Act of 1925, 15 & 16
Geo. 5, c. 84, § 1; Workmen's Compensation Act of 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 58, § 1; Workmen's
Compensation Act of 1897, 60 & 61 Vict., c. 37, § 1. Statutes in forty-one states and the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 3 U.S.C. § 902 (1964), use
identical language.
2 The two theories most often put forward to suppqrt cpmpensation statutes suggest
that only those losses connected to employment should be covered. Under the 9ccupa-
tional risk theory of compensation, the cost pf 1vofk connected disability is imposed on
employers so that the costs of human death and disability connected With the production
of goods, and only those costs, may be passed on to the consumer. W. PROssER, LAW OF
TORTS § 82, at 554-55 (3d ed. 1964). The theory of "least social cost," which according to
E. DqwvNEy, WqRKMEN'S -CPMPENSATION 9 (1924), is "thap distrilution of unavpidable
losses ... which imposes the least hardship upon individuals and results in the smallest
diminution of the community's economic assets," may be less restrictive, but under either
theory the statute requires a connection between compensable disability and employment.
See Larson, The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 37'CoRNELL L.Q. 206
(1952). For the reasons why an employment connection is required, see E. CHEaT, INJURY
AND REcOVERY IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT 145 (1961).
3 Professor Hart argues that the Supreme Court is wasting its time rendering Federal
Employers' Liability Act decisions. Hart, Forward: The Time Chart 9f tk Jj.stces, 73
HARv. L. REv. 84, 96 (1959). Many of those decisiens involve essentially the same problems
as arisp under the worktuen's p99pensatgn statutes. On the oter hand, Thurman Arnold
argues that the Feder& Emplqyers' liabijity Act decisiqns were necessary to establish
standards. Arnpo, ro1essor Hart's Theology, 7 1Iv. L. REV. 1298, 1304 (1960).
4 One restr1cye view qf the wok connection fqrmula requires that the risk be
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interpreting the work connection so liberally that injuries only re,
motely related to the employment are covered.5 The resulting body
of law has been characterized as "unsatisfactory and often bizarre. '",
The wide variation in the scope of coverage stems in large part
from a shift in attitude concerning the imposition of compensation
liability on the employer. An initial hostility to non-fault liability re-
sulted in rigid limits of coverage, 7 but its gradual acceptance has been
accompanied by the expansion of coverage through changes in the
statutes and their interpretation. 8 The use of the concept of employer
approval, in both statutes and cases, to support the necessary work
connection has contributed substantially to this liberalization. 9 Yet,
within the workmen's compensation literature, employer approval is
peculiar to the employment and not common to the public. Thus, many courts denied
coverage when the injury was the result of a risk such as a sun stroke or lightning. Even
the risks of the street were excluded in many states on the theory that these were shared
by the general public. See 1 A. LAR ON, supra note 1, §§ 8-9.
A more liberal and generally accepted view suggests that there should be coverage
where the risks are connected to employment, even though they are otherwise common
risks.
5 In Gondeck v. Pan American Airways, 382 U.S. 25 (1965), a workman was killed in a
jeep accident on San Salvador Island while returning to a defense base after recreation
at a nearby town. The accident occurred after completion of the day's work, but the
victim was on call for emergencies. The court of appeals found no benefit to the employ-
ment in this recreation, and no evidence relating the recreation to his employment.
299 F.2d 74, 77 (5th Cir. 1962). The Supreme Court reversed, saying:
In O'Keeffe .. we reaffirmed the Brown-Pacific-Maxon holding that the
Deputy Commissioner need not find a causal relation between the nature of the
victim's employment and the accident, nor that the victim was engaged in activity
of benefit to the employer at the time of his injury or death. No more is required
than that the obligations or conditions of employment create the "zone of special
danger" out of which the injury or death arose.
382 U.S. at 27.
6 L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 76 (1964).
7 For a fuller description see H. SOMERs & A. SoMERs, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION,
ch. 2 (1954).
8 [A] gradual process of expansion and improvement in most workmen's compen-
sation systems has occurred. New categories of employees and employers have
been added, benefits have been increased, and new kinds of injuries have been
covered, notably occupational diseases.
Larson, Compensation Reform in the United States, in OCCUPATIONAL DISABILITY AND
PUBLIC POLICY 13 (E. Cheit & M. Gordons eds. 1963).
It is a familiar sight in compensation law to observe a doctrine getting started
in the form of an apparently exceptional concession in an unusual or limited class
of cases, only to be followed by the necessity of extending the supposedly excep-
tional rule to more and more comparable cases, until ultimately the exception has
become the rule.
1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 25.23, at 452A.
9 Massachusetts abandoned the doctrine that risks of the street were not employment
risks by using a reference to employer approval of employee trips when it provided:
For the purposes of this section any person, while operating or using a motor
or other vehicle, whether or not belonging to his employer, with his employer's
[Vol. 54:97
EMPLOYER APPROVAL
an almost unnoticed10 and completely unexplained aspect of work
connection cases.
Employer approval is an act by the employer which indicates that
he considers the activity or situation in which the injury occurred as
being a part of employment. Accordingly, acts of employer approval
are relevant most often in cases concerning the "course of employment"
requirement, which emphasizes the time, place, and circumstances
surrounding the injury, and are less likely to be relevant to the "aris-
ing from" requirement, which looks to the causal relationship between
injury and employment." This article collects and analyzes "course of
employment" cases where employer approval of employee activities
appears to have had an effect on the decision, for example, cases up-
general authorization or approval, in the performance of work in connection with
the business affairs or undertakings of his employer [shall be covered] ....
MASS. GEN. LAws ANN., ch. 152, § 26 (1965). See Caron's Case, 351 Mass. 406, 221 N.E.2d
871 (1966), where the decedent drove his car to attend a company dinner party, and
where there was an active discussion of company business. His death while en route
home after the party was covered under that statute cited above.
The case law includes: B.J. Gump Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 411 Ill. 196, 103 N.E.2d
504 (1952); Sica v. Retail Credit Co., 245 Md. 606, 227 A.2d 33 (1967); Dyer v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 350 Mich. 92, 85 N.W.2d 152 (1957); Harrison v. Stanton, 26 N.J. Super.
194, 97 A.2d 687 (App. Div. 1953), af'd per curiam, 14 NJ. 172, 101 A.2d 554 (1954);
Caporale v. Department of Taxation, 2 App. Div. 2d 91, 153 N.Y.S.2d 738 (3d Dep't 1956),
aff'd mem., 2 N.Y.2d 946, 142 N.E.2d 213, 162 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1957); American Motors Corp. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 1 Wis. 2d 261, 83 N.W.2d 714 (1957). But see Elliott v. Darby, 382
S.W.2d 70 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964), distinguishing employer toleration from approval and
denying coverage when a welder was injured welding barrels for a local club on em-
ployer's premises after hours and without pay.
10 Despite extensive workmen's compensation literature, employer approval is given
only passing mention. But see, e.g., W. MALONE & M. PLANT, CASES ON WORKMEN'S
COMPNSATION 145-47 (1963), where the notes call attention again and again to the
presence of employer approval.
11 The statutory formula of "arising from" or "in the course of" is often treated as
having two requirements. For examples of "in the course of" cases, see generally Wilson &
Co. v. Curry, 259 Ala. 685, 68 So. 2d 548 (1953); Harrison v. Stanton, 26 N.J. Super. 194,
97 A.2d 687 (App. Div. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 14 NJ. 172, 101 A.2d 554 (1954); Miller v.
F. A. Bartlett Tree Expert Co., 3 N.Y.2d 654, 148 N.E.2d 296, 171 N.Y.S.2d 77 (1958).
The "arising" cases are discussed in 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, §§ 6-8. United States
Steel Corp. v. Mason, 227 N.E.2d 694 (Ind. App. Ct. 1967), is an example of an "arising
from" case for which approval was relevant. There the claimant crane operator, intoxi-
cated at the time of his injury, was awarded compensation because his employer knew of
this violation and failed to take steps to eliminate any appearance of non-acquiescence.
The distinction between "arising" and "in the course" often helps in coming to grips
with the problem, A. MALONE & M. PLANT, supra note 10, at 140-41, and the distinction
is useful in making a functional classification of the cases. The necessary work connection,
however, is probably equally well defined as a single concept. See 1 A. LARSON, supra
note 1, § 29.10; Malone, Some Recent Developments in the Substantive Law of Workmen's
Compensation, 16 VAND. L. ReLv. 1039, 1050-51 (1963); Malone, The Compensable Risk,
31 RocKy MT. L. Rxv. 447 (1959).
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holding awards for injuries suffered in recreational and social activ-
ities,12 or in lunchroom or other employment connected facilities.1 3
These employer approval cases are compared with otherwise factually
similar cases where acts of approval are said to be irrelevant or are
disregarded,' for example, cases denying coverage to employees in-
jured while eating lunch or smoking on the employer's premises,15
or while engaged in social and recreational activities structured around
employment.' 6 This comparison both facilitates an understanding of
the effect of employer approval on work connection decisions and
suggests a method for using approval to establish consistent limits
of coverage.
I
POSSIBLE USES OF EMPLOYER A PROVAL
A. Direct Use of Approval
Acts of approval can have contractual significance. 1'7 An employer's
acts are sufficiently explicit, for example, When he directs or orders
" 12 Ir'i Lybraid, Ros Bios. & Mofg~mery v: Ifndusirial Comm'n, 36 Ill. 2d 410, 223
N.E.2d 150 (1907), decedent, a personnel manager for the employer, drove his car to an
annual firm golf outing. The emplpyer underrPte the costs. The decedent died as a
result of injuries sustained in an accident on the home trip. Compensation was awarded,
the court distinguishing Becker Asphaltum Roofing Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 333 Ill.
340, 164 N.E. 668 (1929) (where compensation was' denied employee injured on way to
company picnic), principally on the theory that there was no compulsion in Becker even
though employees attending were given pay for a half day's work. Also, the Becker
employer merely furnished soft drinks and ice cream but in Lybrand he furnished all
the food. Perhaps more important than the distinctions based on compulsion or em-
ployer control is the fact that several related cases, principally Jewel Tea Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 6 Ill. 2d 304, 128 N.E.2d 699 (1955), intervenea between Becker and Lybrand.
Fqr comments on jewel Tea see Note, Wprkmen's Compensation Awards for Recreational
Injuries, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 328-35 (1956).
13 See Inland Mfg. Div., G.M.d. y. Lawson, 232 N.E.2d 657 (Ohio C.P. 1967), where
employee, injured wh n she slipped on a peach pit returning to work after lunch in a
cafeteria operated ly a third party on the employer's premises, was held to be covered.
The court relied on the limitation of the lunch period to 35 minutes and the unavail-
ability of other suitable eating facilities for female employees, as well as the fact that the
premises were employer owned and thus approved.
14 See McFarland v. St. Louis Car Co., 262 S.W.2d 344 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953), where
the court said; "We do not consider it of impqrtant p99sequence thai the employer
acquiesced in, or contributed some financial assistance to, such [recreationa] activities."
262 S.W.2d at 348.
15 In Clarke v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 97 R.I. 163, 196 A.2d 428 (1964), the claimant ate
her lunch whenever she could find time in a room provided for that purpose. After lunch
she irxjured her back while bending over to put out her cigarette in a special cigarette
bucket provided by the employer. Comppnsation was denied.
16 See Becker Asphaltuin Roofing Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 333 Ill. 340, 164 N.E.
668 (1929), discussed in note 12 supra.
'7 What has contractual significance is a difficult question. G. GasmoRE, CONTRACTs
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the activity, or the employment dontract itself or ratified change in
that contract fixes the limits of the course of the einployrerit.18 Nev-
erthbless, acts of approval insufficient to support a contractual inter-
pretation are also feadily admitted into evidence and used to enlarge
coverage. The direct use of such acts to decide a specific controversy
makes an adverse result more understandable to the mployr Since
his own actions indicated that reshlt. Although this mediational use
of approval resembles estoppel in that the affected employer's actions
are tited to coni'ince hih to accept an otheiwise adverse result, it has
beeh considered an extension of the employer's contractual power to
enlarge the area of covrage.19
If if ii asshimed tiat 6very activity approved by the employer
benefits thd eniployment, then the use of evidence of employer afr
proval to impose coverage has as a doctrinal basis the principle that the
burdens of an employmerit relationship should follow the benefits. 20
The converse, however, may also be tdue: the use of benefits to sup-
port coveiage may be appropriate only because benefits imply em-
ployer approval ind require recognition of an employment connection.
Benefit and approval are intei-felated consideratiohs; indeed, they
represent different aspects of the sain question-whether the em-
145 (Murray ed. 1967), distinguishes between rules which select the manifestations of
intent that comprise a contract (rules of evidefice) and the r6cess of iherprkatiofi:
"While the two steps are distinct in theoky, in practice it is seldom possible to separate
them." While declarations against interest are generally both relevant and reliable, see
Nubi, Declarations A ainit Inteicit" A Critlcal Review of the Utiaviailability Requir nent,
52 CoRNELL L. . 301 (1967), fhd r ibibility 61 eiplby&i' d6dchitti6fs b approvl wiidhn
they follow the injury has been questioned in such cases as Charles v; Industrial Comm'n,
2 Ariz. App. 202, 407 P.2d 391 (1965):
Too often it occurs that when the employer is carrying insurice, and tfifih siffers
rio pecuniary loss himself throsili an Accident to his employe&, ihat his hiatiiral
emotions of sympathy for an injured man, and interest in an old and trusted
employee; leads hini to the limits of; or even beyond the bburids of, strict veracity,
in his endeavor to assist the injured party td recover from the insurance carrier. .
Id. at 204, 407 P.2d at 393, quoting United States v. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 43 Ariz. 305,
311, 30 P.2d 846; 849 (1934).
18 Pribyl v. Standard Elec. Co., 246 Iowa 383, 67 N.W.2d 438 (1954).
19 Larson points out the effect of employer approval by noting:
it is unquestionably within his power to enlarge the "course of employment" area
by affirmative action in recreation situations, just as he can bring the lunch
h6ur or the journey to and from work within the orbit of employment by agree-
ifieht *ith the eiiployee and by payifiefii for the time so spent.
1 A. LAiioN, supra note 1, § 22.0.
If the acts utbd to impose coverage are irsuficieit t8 support a contiaitt interpretitin
they might be used to detetihiine the limits of bdverag6 merely because there are no other
relevant guides to resolve the cdntroversy. Such actd are ieieanti because they concefn a
work connection and are reliable because made in neutral circixmstiaes.
20 Mdi, cases stress benefit o ad actiurity to the empioymdit iii cohcluding that the
actlvity is covered, but nbrle ieqiir that ih ti vity beiefit the employer. W. MALONE &
M. PiANT, supra note 10, at 165.
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ployer recognized, or should recognize, a connection between the ac-
tivity and the employment. But no matter what theory supports the
use of acts of approval as the basis of coverage, that usage might
not please the compensation carrier, or other similarly situated but
uncompensated employees.
Although the use of employer approval, either alone or in concert
with the "benefit" theory, may explain the result in specific cases, it
is hard to justify the refusals to impose compensation in cases that
differ from successful award cases only in the absence of approval. The
result is a variation in the extent of coverage, causing affected parties,
especially compensation insurance carriers, to find the balancing pro-
cess unsatisfactory because it reduces predictability. This is both in-
efficient2' and inequitable22 since one workman will be denied cov-
erage, while another, in substantially similar circumstances, will re-
cover compensation because his employer, by some relevant act, ap-
proved his employee's activity. Furthermore, since the employer who
displays acts of approval assumes greater liability, either directly or
through an increase in compensation premiums based on a poor ex-
perience rating; the result penalizes him and rewards employers who
deny approval to employee activities.2
B. Indirect Use by Communicating Functional Standards
If the instances of approval of a given activity have been meaning-
ful or frequent enough, decision-making bodies can achieve equality
and predictability by using employer approval indirectly, inferring
approval in factually similar cases where no actual act of approval
appears. Thus, wider uniform limits of coverage could'be established
by confirming that such activity is now work connected in all cases.2 4
21 Efficiency as a goal of workmen's compensation seems singularly appropriate since
wastefulness and the antagonism created between employer and employee by the wasteful
common law system of settlements was urged upon business as a reason to accept work-
men's compensation. Gellhorn & Lauer, The Administration of the New York Workmen's
Compensation Law, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 3, 9 (1962).
22 Gondeck v. Pan American Airways, 382 U.S. 25 (1965), discussed in note 5 supra,
is an interesting example of an attempt to treat alike the survivors of employees killed in
the same accident despite a desire to have finality in judgments. Subsequent to the denial
of recovery (through denial of a motion for rehearing) in the Supreme Court, the Fourth
Circuit upheld awards to the survivors of another employee killed in the same accident.
Because of a desire for equal treatment, the Supreme Court vacated the earlier order
denying certiorari and reversed the judgment for the defendant.
23 For a discussion which questions the effect of merit ratings on prevention of work
injuries, see H. SoMass & A. SoMEats, supra note 7, at 228-30.
24 Larson notes that it is sometimes assumed that compensation,, unlike other areas
of the law, is not reducible to principles and rules because of the "tendency of compen-
[Vol. 54:97
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The new standard would bind not only the employers whose acts
communicated the work connection, but all employers in similar cir-
cumstances despite their failure to communicate such approval. In any
change in the outer limits, a guide for the administration of coverage
is necessary. The absence or rejection of doctrinal guides opens the
way to the use of acts of employer approval. The use of acts of approval,
however, makes factual guides necessary to avoid inequality, even
though such guides are open to criticism.
II
ESTABLISHING FACrUAL GUIDES
A. Coming and Going
Traveling to and from work is certainly connected to employment,
but in this country25 an employee injured during this time is generally
excluded from coverage on the ground that commuting is not in the
course of employment.26 This broad exclusionary rule has been mod-
ified by numerous exceptions,27 often involving some reference to
employer approval to support the necessary work connection.2 8
The coming and going exclusion may be justified on the ground
that the employee selects where he lives, and thus his travel between
home and job site is for his own benefit or convenience. In other
words, because every employee travels to work, coming and going is
not attributable to a particular employment.29 Perhaps an equally
sation law to grow up around factual rather than legal classifications (producing, for
example, a street-risk rule and an epileptic-fall rule rather than a general causation
rule) . 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, at iii. It might be suggested that the desire for
equality and efficiency dictate these factual classifications because otherwise the results
would vary too widely.
25 German and French law covers coming and going. Riesenfeld, Contemporary
Trends in Compensation for Industrial Accidents Here and Abroad, 42 CALIF. L. Rav.
531, 549 (1954).
26 See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 15.
27 Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469 (1947), classifies the exceptions to
the exclusion of coming and going injuries into four main categories:
(I) where the employment requires the employee to travel on the highways; (2)
where the employer contracts to and does furnish transportation to and from
work; (3) where the employee is subject to emergency calls, as in the case of fire-
men; (4) where the employee uses the highway to do something incidental to his
employment, with the knowledge and approval of the employer.
Id. at 480 (emphasis added).
28 See Caron's Case, 351 Mass. 406, 221 N.E.2d 871 (1966), discussed in note 9 supra;
Binet v. Ocean Gate Bd. of Educ., 90 N.J. Super. 571, 218 A.2d 869 (App. Div. 1966);
Cornelius v. Brock, 27 App. Div. 2d 604, 275 N.Y.S.2d 632 (3d Dep't 1966) (mem.).
29 In Quarant v. Industrial Comm'n, 38 IIl. 2d 490, 231 N.E2d 397 (1967), a teacher
1968]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:97
important reason for the general exclusionary rule is the adminis-
trative difficulty that would arise if the limits of coverage for coming
and going were not drawn tightly around the employer's premises.§
0
The wealth of exceptions to the rule, however, suggest that these
reasons are not too convincing. In Some instances the use of acts of
emplqyer approval may give relipf from the rigors of the exclusion.
Although commuting is generally deemed personal and not cov-
ered, an employer has the power to bring such travel within the scope
of coverage. By contracting for travel time in an employment contract,
an employer brings coming and going injuries within the course of
employment.31 The employment connection for the ordinary commuter
must be the employer's unambiguous recognition of an existing work
connection.
But lesser acts can also bring this activity within coverage. An
employer willing to furnish a vehicle or pay transportation costs shows
a willingness to accept such costs as expenses of the employment. This
involvement may supply the necessary work connection even if the em-
ployer did not consider the compensation liability implications of
his act. Payment of wages for the time consumed would help support
the employment connection, but it is not essential. Furthermore, the
driving to school was injured when a stpder nt drifvr swerved and hit her. The court
denied compensation, holding that she was not subject to greater hazard by reason of her
employment than other people using the highway.
30 CoMning and going is excluded because "it is a fair question whether the un-
certainty and litigaon thereby imported ... would ... offset the respltant advantages"
if coming and going were included. E. DOWNEY, supra note 2, at 27.
31 Although there wa* no express cpntract for compen.sation coverage, the memoran-
dum decisign of the Court of Appeals in Solomon v. Russo, 20 N.Y.2d 688, 229 N.E.2d 231,
282 I".Y.S.2d 554 (1967), relied uppn the employer's agreement "to co pensate" em-
ployees who regularly workpd at one plant for the use of their own automobiles Whep
temporarily working at a second plant in concluding that the emplqyees yere Within
the course of their employmient. Accordijply an empipyee's suit against a fellow em-
ployee for injuries received on such a trip was disimis~ed.
A case involving something more like a contract for compensation coverage is Whaley
v. Steuben Co. Rural Elec. Mem. Corp., - Ind. App. -, 221 N.E.2d 435 (1966), which
reversed the Industrial Board's denial of coverage of a utility company's line foreman
who slipped and fell on the sidewalk when leaving his house to aswer n emergency call.
The opinion empph4aizd a stipulation that "[f]he employer is aware an expect the
employee to use his own car fo rgqch the emsployer's place of business where he will
pick up a service truck." Id. at -, 221 N.E.2d at 436 (emphasis in origina!). This, together
with the evidence that the employee was paid an hourly rate from the time he received
the call until he returned home, justified holding that the Board's denial of coverage was
in error. See Zenith Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 66 Cal. 2d 944, 428
P.2d 606, 59 Cal. Rptr. 622 (1967).
32 In Bryan v.' Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 381 F.2d 872 (8th Cir. 1967), the defendant
insurer's policy excluded coverage of any injury received by an employee "in the course
of such employment in an accident arising out of the maintenance or use' of the insured's
EMPLOYER APPROVAL
neiessary work confiecti6n can be found Whether the agreement to pa7
trarhsporation cdsts was freely made or was required undeir a labor
contract.33
The approval stem-nifig from furnishing trafisportati6n is niean-
ingful because the ecoromic self-ifiterest of iri mplbyir dictates that
he not assume added costs ivithbhit a empidyment reason. Thu§, Wheii
an employer hits ant unambiguous conrictioh with fuiuishihg a vehitle
or transportation (as opposed to an isolated g~ture of kindness)3 4 his
decision involves a meaningful judgment about the relevant employ-
ment connection or benefit to employment. That his decision was
made without an awarehess df the pdsibte c6mp~nsation cbnseliiences
buttresses the conclusioti that he consideied shch activity work c6n-
riected.
A conflict exists, however, between the desire to find an employ-
ment connection solely by reason of some relevant act of empl6yer
approval and the desire to accord equal treatment to all employees
injured in similar circumstances. This conflict is exhibited ifi Rubefi-
dall v. Brogan Construction Co.35 Two employees of a coipafiy that
had two bridges under onstruction at the same time shared the d iv-
ing. On the day of the accident, the decedent was riding in the co-
employee's car. They were i4orking together on one bridge and the
employer directed the decedent's co-employee to take todls from that
bridge to the other near which both employees lived. The decedeht's
trip was deemed not employment conhected and compensation ivis
denied, but the c6-employee's injury was held einployiient connected
because he was directed to take the tobls to be used th$ next day.
The case could be explained as one where the decedent enjoyed em-
ployment connected transportation home on an isolated occasion, arid
therefore the employifent connection w¢as insufficient to overcome the
usual rule that coming and going is not in the course of employment.
automobile. The insured's employee and his w*ife won a judgdient against the diivei of
the insured's bus ind sbght iecovery against the insu rer. The court ifflimed sutkna-y
judgment for the insurer because the ipl6yee being transported to work was in the
couirse of his emplorment uhder both ihd iorkmen's tdmpe&iation statifte and the
liability poiicy exclusion. The: coUrt stiessed, amiong othr ispets 6 the 'ase, that thfe
employee's time started when he left the warehouse on the bus.
i3 The' bliati n 'tb pro'vide trahsortttion in Bryan Was uiider the w6riing i-ules
of a union agreement. The relevance of such an agreement is -iot only that it coimnects
the transportation to the employment, but alsb that it indicates more than a casual
provision of transportation. Id. at 877.
34 See Maxim's; Inc. -'. Indusiiixt Cbmin'n, 35 II. 2d 601, 221 N.E.2d 281 (1966).
35 253 Iowa 652, 113 N.W.2d 265 (1962).
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The decedent's place of work on the following, day was disputed;3 6
if it could have been shown that he was to work on the other bridge,
the furnishing of transportation by the co-worker might have sup-
plied the connection. Using the acts of the employer (the direction
to the co-employee to take the tools to the other job) is the only
technique that supports coverage for the driver and not the decedent.
This solution, however, does not provide similar treatment for those
in factually similar circumstances.
B. Coffee Breaks, Lunch and Other Incidental Activities
Approval may support coverage of many activities near the work
premises, especially activities that neither interrupt the employee's
principal activities for more than a brief period nor take him far
from his work site. Thus, when activities incidental to employment,
such as smoking, taking a coffee break, or eating are covered,87 that
coverage may grow out of the relative unimportance of the work in-
terruption, since incidental deviations, unlike coming and going, do
not require exclusion for administrative convenience.38 Also, the doc-
trine that acts of personal comfort are covered justifies such coverage.39
Some incidental activities cases, however, involve a judgment
by the employer that the activity is employment connected. An em-
ployer who pays for entertainment or for a midnight snack40 makes
a meaningful act of approval, 'nd should not be surprised to find the
activity covered. Such an act provides a rational basis for a decision
36 Id. at 655, 113 N.W.2d at 267. Compare, however, the results in Rubendall with
those in Solomon v. Russo, 20 N.Y.2d 688, 229 N.E.2d 231, 282 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1967), dis-
cussed in note 31 supra.
37 Coffee break: Sweet v. Kolosky, 259 Minn. 253, 106 N.W.2d 908 (1960). But see
Williams v. Industrial Comm'n, 38 IlL. 2d 593, 232 N.E.2d 744 (1967).
Eating: Inland Mfg. Div., G.M.C. v. Lawson, 232 N.E.2d 657 (Ohio C.P. 1967), discussed
in note 13 supra. But see Clarke v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 97 R.I 163, 196 A.2d 423 (1964),
discussed in note 15 supra.
38 Since the very early cases the employee on the premises has enjoyed compensation
protection even though not engaged in work. See Norris v. New York Cent. R.R., 246 N.Y.
307, 158 N.E. 879 (1927), where it was assumed that an employee killed during a rest
period was killed by an accident arising out of the course of employment.
39 See American Motors Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, I Wis. 2d 261, 83 N.W.2d 714
(1957). The court, quoting 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 21.00, expressed the doctrine
as follows:
Employees who, within the time and space limits of their employment, engage in
acts which minister to personal comfort do not thereby leave the course of em-
ployment, unless the extent of the departure is so great that an intent to abandon
the job temporarily be inferred ....
Id. at 265, 83 N.W.2d at 716.
40 Cress v. Sheldahl Tel. Co., 258 Iowa 292, 139 N.W.2d 190 (1965).
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that the activity was employment connected for compensation pur-
poses. Although courts affirming awards in these cases talk about
the benefit to the employment received from the satisfied employee
and mention the slight effect that incidental and personal comfort
activities have on the continuity of the course of employment, it is
probable that acts of approval, perhaps evidenced by custom 41 of em-
ployers who saw a relevant work connection, have played a significant
role in extending coverage for coffee breaks and other previously ex-
cluded incidental activities. 42
C. Recreation and Social Activities
Coverage is generally allowed for injuries received in a social
situation which, because of the presence of possible customers, is
semi-workstructured and is recognized as such by the employer. For
example, an employee is covered on a hunting trip sponsored or ap-
proved by the employer.43 Courts cite the business purpose of the
social activity and sometimes cite either the employer's approval of
his employee's presence as a guest 4 or the approval by the host em-
ployer.45 Similarly, an employer's efforts to solicit customers through
employee participation in a service organization and its related social
activities result in coverage and have even been cited as support for
41 The departure of an employee for a matter of minutes from the premises
where he works to satisfy a personal desire, such as to get a cup of coffee or a
newspaper, especially when it becomes a custom within the knowledge of the
employer should not be held . . . a separation from employment.
Redfield v. Boulevard Gardens Housing Corp., 4 App. Div. 2d 906, 907, 167 N.Y.S.2d 59,
61 (3d Dep't 1957) (emphasis added).
42 In Callaghan v. Brown, 218 Minn. 440, 16 N.W.2d 317 (1944), recovery was denied
to an employee injured on a coffee break. Sixteen years later, when the Minnesota court
in Sweet v. Kolosky, 259 Minn. 253, 106 N.W.2d 908 (1960), granted recovery for coffee
break injuries, the only obvious distinction was that express permission to take a coffee
break was given in Sweet while such express permission was lacking in Callaghan.
43 Fintzel v. Stoddard Tractor & Equip. Co., 219 Iowa 1263, 260 N.W. 725 (1935); cf.
Snyder v. General Paper Corp., 277 Minn. 376, 152 N.W.2d 743 (1967) (employee choking
to death on a piece of meat while entertaining customer is covered).
44 See Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Sanderfer, 382 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Civ. App.
1964), where the employee of an oil drilling company was granted compensation for
injuries incurred while deer hunting as a guest of company with which the employer
dealt. The court noted that the employer had asked the claimant to go on the hunt to
promote goodwill for the company.
45 See, e.g., County of Peoria v. Industrial Comm'n, 31 Ill. 2d 562, 202 N.E.2d 504
(1964). There, the county sheriff held a party for several deputies and others at his
cottage. The court held that a deputy who was killed while assisting a motorist on the
adjacent highway was within the course of his employment because the sheriff had
asked the guests to help the motorist and because helping distressed motorists was a
normal duty of deputy sheriffs.
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coverage of an employee injured While taking his babysitter home
after returning from a servie6 club dantce.6
Coniperisation f6r ifijuries suffered A s6cial dents with6ut d.-
vertiing aliie is less easily explained except by ref~refife ib employer
approval tirdiigh the acceptance of related costs. Such approval, hi
distinghished ft6mi rier toleration bir periftission, playg a larger role
heie than iii semi-social evfttis with cdst6mes.
47 Examples of seeim-
ihgly "piire ot'ial events where the employmeiit cbnn&ti6n iecs-
sary for compensation coverage has been found iiidtid i all-exPbhs6
fishing trip for employees who win sales contests,
4 8 the company picnic,4 9
the company Christmas party, 0 and the intra-company softball league.5 '
Courts have cited both direct employer bdhefits such As increased em-
ployee intiegt iri the enloer's work62 and indiiect benefits such as
empl6yee identificatioi With the buginess, riaxation, aniid camaraderie
t6 hphold coverage in these cases.53 In addition to the benefit argu-
ments, employer control or coercion is sometimes stressed, r4 and
48 Hariisbh v. Stanton, 26 N.J. Super. 194, 97 A.2d 687 (App. Div; 1958), aff'd, 14 N.J.
172, 101 A.2d 554 (1954). The opinion summarized a few of the criteria to be used in
such cases to determine whether there was sufficient relatioiship between the enpioy-
ment and th6 recr6ation to justify in awaid:
(aj fli ciistomary fiatufe (f th attivity; (b) the employer's eicduragement or
subsidization of the activity; (c) the extent to which the employer managed or
directed th6 iecrbaioiihl enterprise; (d) the presenEe Of substantial inf uencC oi
aftuiil cdmpulsioh txertid upbh ihe emtloye6 to attend and participate; dnd (6)
the fact that tim dmpioytr expects or receives a beriefit from the employee's par-
ticipation in the activity.
26 N.J. Super. at 199; 97 A.2d at 699.
47 The advertising value of employee recreational attivities has been cited to bring
those events within the otrse of emplo ment. See, e.g., Rafti v. Merrill Lynch; Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Irc., 20 App. Div. 2d 592, 245 N.Y.S.2d 223 (3d Dep't 1963) (mem.),
where the court noted that the employedr prbvid'ed sbftball uniforms containing em-
ployer's initials and aiirmed the compbnsation award. See also Le Bar v. Ewald Bros.
Dairy, 217 Minn. 16, 13 N.W.2d 729 (1944).
48 Lindermaii v. Cowni6 Furs, 234 Iowa 708; 13 N.W.2d 677 (1944). For criticism of
this case see Merrill, Fifteen Yedrt More of Workizen's Compeisation in Iowa; 32 IoWA
L. Rav. 1, 30 (1946).
49 Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgohiery v. Industrial Cbmm'n, 36 Ill. 2d 410, 223
N.E.2d 150 (1967); Miller v. Keystone Appliancds; Inc.; 133 Pa. Super. 354, 2 A.2d 508 (1938).
SO In re Torkts v. Triangle Handbag Mfg. Co.; 13 App. Div. 2d 559, 211 N.Y.S.2d
992 (3d Dep't 1961) (claimant stabbed by cb-worker at employer's Christmas party).
51 Jewel Tea Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 6 Ill. 2d 304, 128 N.E.2d 699 (1955); Tocci v.
Tesslr & Weiss, fi., 28 N.J. 582, 147 A.2d 783 (1959); Rafti v. Merrill Lynch; Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc.; 20 App. Div. 2d 592; 245 N.Y.S.2ta 223 (3d Dep't 1963) (mdm.).
82 Miller v. Keystone Appliances, Iric., 133 Pa. Super. 354; 2 A.2d 508 (1938).
53 Jewel Tea Co: v. Industrial Commfin, 6 Ill: 2d 304; 128 N.E.2d 699 (1955); Linder-
man v. Cownie Furs, 234 Iowa 708, 13 N.W:2d 677 (1944).
54 See Shoemake Sta. v. Stephens, 277 P.2d 998 (Okla. 19545 (empldyer induced em-
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whether the activity is customary is also said to be relevant.55 Since
nothing in the statutory formula require employer benefit as a condi-
tion of coverage, the key to recovery may be th employer' acceptance
of related costs or other acknowledgement that the event is work con-
nected.
When an employer compels attendance at a social or recreational
event by excusing the employee from iyqr- at f411 pay on the condition
that he attend, 6 or when the employer approves such aciyities as
intra-company softball games by furnishing uniforms or the place to
play, he is not merely tolerating the event, but rather is recognizing
that it is structured, at least in part, on the basis of employment.57
Therefore, it is reasonable to accept the employer's recognition of the
relationship between the activity and the employment and to treat
resulting injury as employment related for compensation purposes.
When the indicia of approval, such as the furnishing of premises
58
or bearing of sime costs,59 appear neutral, an employer's declaration
that he is not recognizing a work reation has been deemed sufficient to
ployee to don boxing gloves and spar with him); Salt Lake City v. Industrial Comm'n,
104 Utah 436, 140 P.2d 644 (1943) (city fireman required to take exercise injured pn
employer's handball court).
55 See, e.g., American Steel Foundaries v. Czpala, 112 Ind. App. 212, 44 N.E.2d 204
(1942), where'a coffee bottle warmed in the furnace as usual, exploded. Warming coffee
at lunch time was found to be a customary practice, and the aivard was affirmed. But see
Williams v. Industrial Cotm'n, 38 Ill. 2d 59P, N.E.2d 744 (1967), where a butch,
"as he customarily did," stood behind a meat counter drinking coffee and eating a dough-
nut, choked on the doughnut, blacked out as he walked toward a wastebasket and fell.
The Industrial Commission's award was reversed.
In Le Bar v. Ewald Bros. Dairy, 217 Minn. 16, 13 N.W.2d 729 (1944), the fact that
employer customarily sponsored several types of athletic teams was held to show that
sponsorship of the softball team was deemed desirable for the business.
56 Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgomery v. Industrial Comm'n, 36 Ill. 2d 410, 223
N.E.2d 150 (1967). See Chorley v. Koerner Ford, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 242, 225 N.E.2d 737, 279
N.Y.S.2d 4 (1967) (award granted where deceased died of heart failure after engaging in
strenuous dancing at an employer sponsored party which 1vas held to inprease employee
motivation); Hendren v. Industrial Comm'n, 19 Ill. 2d 44, 166 N.E.2d 76 (1960) (corn-
pensatin awarded when employer granted claimant and other employees time off for
participation in spftball games).
57 See Elliott v. Darby, 382 S.W.2d 70 (Mp. Ct. App. 1964), distinguishing employer
toleration from approval and denying coverage when employee was injured welding
barrels for local dub on employer's premises, after hours, without pay and supervision.
58 Tocd v. Tessler & Weiss, Inc., 8 NJ. 582, 147 A.2d 783 (1959). "
59 Le Bar v. Ewald Bros. Dairy, 217 Minn. 16, 13 N.W.2d 729 (1944). But see
McFarland Y. St. Louis Car Co., 262 S.W.2d 344 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953), where denial of
recovery was affirmed, the court stating, "We do not consider it of important cpnsequence
that the emplpyer acquiesced in, or contributed some financial assistace to, such activi-
ties." Id. at 348.
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prevent the exercise of his power to enlarge coverage." Finally, the
employment connection is generally denied when recreational activ-
ities are employee organized and no employer approval can be shown.,'
This different treatment of substantially similar cases has been the
subject of criticism.62 Although coverage may someday be extended to
employee organized social activities that are work-structured unless
the employer expressly disapproves,63 the present state of the law offers
a further instance of the effectiveness of employer approval in bringing
coverage to a previously excluded area.
D. Prohibited Conduct
Employer approval is relevant in cases upholding coverage of in-
juries received while engaged in otherwise prohibited conduct.
Although statutes often make intoxication a bar to recovery,64 em-
ployer approval or acquiescence in an employee's intoxication has been
mentioned in upholding an award despite such a statute.65 The rules
governing the rights of an employee injured in horseplay are in a state
of flux and involve factors other than approval.66 Nevertheless, cases
upholding coverage for employees injured in horseplay on the ground
that horseplay has long been an "incident of the employment,"0' 7 are
merely making an indirect reference to the employer's custom of ac-
quiescence as approval of the conduct. Similarly, charging an employer
with knowledge that boys will shoot paper clips from rubber .bands65
is merely a step in the direction of finding employer acquiescence in,
or approval of, playful activities to award coverage.
60 Iacovino v. National Biscuit Co., 18 App. Div. 2d 741, 235 N.Y.S.2d 511 (3d
Dep't 1962).
61 See McFarland v. St. Louis Car Co., 262 S.W.2d 344 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953).
62 See Bonin, Workmen's Compensation Law: Reviews of Leading Current Cases, 23
NACCA L.J. 147 (1959), which describes the "'no-man's land' of employer sponsorship
with no compensation for injuries." Id. at 156.
63 Discontinuance of employer sponsored recreation programs would be unlikely
even if compensation liability were generally imposed on recreational programs. Id.
64 See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-1208 (1965).
65 United States Steel Corp. v. Mason, 227 N.E.2d 694 (Ind. App. Ct. 1967).
66 Horovitz, Assaults and Horseplay Under Workmen's Compensation Laws, 41
ILL. L. RFv. 311 (1946).
67 Industrial Comm'n v. McCarthy, 295 N.Y. 443, 446, 68 N.E.2d 484, 435, 55 N.Y.S.2d
15, 16 (1946).
68 Johnson v. Loew's, Inc., 7 App. Div. 2d 795, 180 N.Y.S.2d 826 (3d Dep't 1958)




EMPLOYEE'S ACTS AS DETERMINING COVERAGE
If employer approval of an activity can make it work connected
for compensation purposes because it is implied, correctly or not,
that the employer saw an employment connection in the activity, then
the question arises whether an employee should have a similar power.
The humanitarian purposes behind compensation legislation, however,
should not allow minor acts or declarations of an injured employee
to control whether he was "in the course" of his employment. Whereas
the use of minor acts of the employer to find the necessary employment
connection is appropriate because the effect of his acts will not bear
too hard upon him, the consequences of a denial of coverage to the
employee are so severe than any act on his part sufficient to deny
coverage must be not only unambiguous but of sufficient importance
to bring home to the employee that he has left the course of his em-
ployment.69 Thus, even though an employee's power to take himself
out of the course of employment cannot be denied, to be sufficient,
his act must be "unusual, rash and unjustifiable."70 For these reasons,
acts of employer approval have played a meaningful role in determin-
ing the limits of coverage while employee acts have made no similar
contribution.
CONCLUSION
Through their acts of approval, affected employers can and do
communicate perceived work connections and standards of work con-
nections to the adminstrators of workmen's compensation laws. This
flow of information can be used for mediational settlement of par-
ticular disputes and is a consent to changes in standards resulting
from the receipt of the information. The resulting body of law,
although perhaps still unsatisfactory, will at least have been achieved
through an understandable process. Advocates and administrators
should be aware of the process and focus attention upon acts of em-
ployer approval to determine when they are meaningful and whether
the effect of such acts should be limited to the resolution of specific
disputes to extend the limits of coverage.
69 See Rucker v. Nassau-Beckman Realty Corp., 272 App. Div. 982, 78 N.Y.S.2d 275
(8d Dep't 1947) (per curiam).
70 See Pohler v. T.W. Snow Constr. Co., 289 Iowa 1018, 1028, 38 N.W.2d 416, 421
(1948).
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